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When Art Might Constitute a Taking:
A Takings Clause Inquiry Under the
Visual Artists Rights Act
ABSTRACT
At first glance, a federal statute protecting the moral rights of
artists and their artwork seems like a unanimous victory. But it turns
out that government action protecting certain works of art attached to
buildings may give rise to a valid takings clause claim under the Fifth
Amendment. Without compensation, a regulation requiring a landowner
to maintain someone else’s property on his land would constitute a
taking. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) requires
landowners to maintain protected artwork attached to buildings or
potentially face statutory damages. Although only one court has heard
and subsequently denied a takings argument in the VARA context, in
the highly contextual nature of the statute, there are still compelling
arguments to be made that VARA-protected art may constitute a taking.
This Note provides background on both VARA and the takings clause
and provides various arguments that a VARA landowner-defendant
could utilize to avoid liability.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

III.

IV.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF VARA ....................................................... 921
A. Moral Rights in the United States Pre-VARA ...................... 924
B. Moral Rights Protection Under VARA ................................. 926
C. A VARA Takings Argument in Court ................................... 929
WHEN VARA MIGHT BE A TAKING ............................................ 930
A. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion .................................... 930
B. VARA as a Regulatory Taking.............................................. 932
C. How VARA May Affect a Property’s Value and Use ............. 934
POTENTIAL TAKINGS ARGUMENTS IN THE VARA CONTEXT....... 935
A. Evaluating the Takings Arguments Made in Carter ........... 935
B. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion .................................... 936
C. VARA as a Total Regulatory Taking .................................... 938
D. A Future for VARA? .............................................................. 940
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 941
919

920

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:919

Imagine that you have just bought a new building in anticipation
of opening a trendy new restaurant in Nashville. Before opening, one of
the first things you want to do is redecorate your new building to match
the restaurant’s trendy theme, which includes replacing a mural on the
side of the building that does not match your desired aesthetic. Instead,
you would like to put up a new mural that is more likely to attract
patrons to your restaurant for Instagram-worthy pictures. A few weeks
after finishing the new mural and opening your new restaurant,
someone you have never met before approaches you and lets you know
that she is suing you for destroying her previously popular mural. Does
an artist really have a say in how you use the property you own? Under
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), an artist may in fact be able to
control how another person can use his property if there is protected
artwork attached to the property.1
Congress enacted VARA in 1990 as an amendment to the
Copyright Act to provide protection for the “moral rights” of artists.2
VARA states that an artist has a lifetime right to prevent any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction, distortion, or any other
modification of artwork that is of “recognized stature.”3 Section 113(d)
of VARA applies these rights to works of recognized stature
incorporated into buildings in such a way that the property owner
cannot remove the work from the building without violating the artist’s
rights.4 As a result, VARA potentially allows an artist to control the use
of another person’s property in its attempt to balance the economic
rights of property owners with the moral rights of artists.5 In this
balancing act, VARA may give rise to a landowner having a legitimate
claim under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.6
1.
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 604, § 113(d), 104 Stat.
5128, 5130–31 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)); cf. Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71
F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995). For a comparable situation, see Adam Sparks, Why Vanderbilt Painted
Over Traditional Coach Mural After 27 Years, THE TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/college/vanderbilt/2019/08/19/vanderbilt-coaches-mural-nashville-westend/2049731001/ [https://perma.cc/Y7VH-X8HE] (Aug. 20, 2019, 1:15 PM).
2.
Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citation
omitted) (“[M]oral rights afford protection for the author’s personal, non-economic interests in
receiving attribution for her work, and in preserving the work in the form in which it was created,
even after its sale or licensing.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 71
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
3.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a), (d).
4.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d); Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The “Recognized Stature” Standard
in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1945 (2000).
5.
See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1935.
6.
William L. Charron & Jason S. Mencher, Painting Your Way to a Lifetime Tenancy
Through the Visual Artists Rights Act, 95 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 196 (2017),
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This Note argues that, in the highly contextual nature of VARA
cases, § 113(d) may give rise to a valid takings clause argument against
the artist. Because of this possibility, courts should keep the takings
doctrine in mind when balancing a property owner’s economic rights
with an artist’s moral rights. Part I provides background on VARA
within the larger scope of copyright law and the history of the takings
clause. Part II applies a potential takings inquiry to VARA and
recognizes certain hurdles that such a takings argument must
overcome. Part III lays out potential takings arguments that a
defendant could utilize to potentially escape VARA liability.
Additionally, Part III contends that Congress and the courts should
more aptly balance economic property rights with VARA’s moral rights
when a work of visual art cannot be removed from a building without
injury to the art and there is no waiver signed by the artist.7
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VARA
When the United States finally signed onto the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989,
the United States symbolically accepted the treaty’s conception of moral
rights in connection with works of visual art.8 The Berne Convention
addresses moral rights in article 6bis:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.9

However, the United States did not immediately amend the
Copyright Act to comply with the Berne Convention’s concept of moral
rights.10 US law resisted recognizing moral rights in part because of the
conflict moral rights have with traditional common law property

https://pryorcashman.gjassets.com/content/uploads/2020/03/BBNA-Insight-Final-PryorCashmanCharron-Mencher.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UY6-Y9LR]. The takings clause states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7.
See Eric E. Bensen, Note, The Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights
Cannot Be Protected Under the United States Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1129 n.3
(1996).
8.
Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990); Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 99-27 (1986), 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
9.
Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6bis.
10.
Damich, supra note 8, at 945–46.
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rights.11 Despite the delay, a year after joining the Berne Convention,
Congress passed the first federal moral rights law in connection with
visual art, the Visual Artists Rights Act.12
VARA grants lifetime moral rights to authors of works of visual
art.13 Moral rights are personal, noneconomic rights that artists have
tied to their works.14 The term “moral rights” is translated from the
French phrase “droit moral,” relating to an author’s ability to control
the eventual fate of the author’s art.15 As a result of the French
translation, the term “moral rights” is a misnomer because moral rights
have nothing to do with a traditional sense of morals.16
VARA’s purpose is to protect two specific moral rights of
artists: the rights of “integrity” and “attribution.”17 The right of
integrity allows an artist to prevent any deformation or mutilation to
his work, even after title to the work has been transferred, as long as
the work is of “recognized stature.”18 The right of attribution grants an
artist the right to be recognized by name as the creator of a work, which
includes the right to prevent the use of the artist’s name on deformed
art originally produced by the artist.19 These rights are not transferable
but are waivable if signed in a written instrument by the artist.20 This
Note focuses primarily on how an artist’s right of integrity under VARA
might infringe upon a building owner’s property rights.

11.
Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Until
recently it was accepted wisdom that the United States did not enforce any claim of moral rights”
(quoting Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997))); Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71
F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8D–15 (1994)) (“The obligation of the United States to provide droit moral . . . was the single
most contentious issue surrounding Berne adherence.” (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE 1022 (1994))).
12.
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). On December 1, 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act
was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush as Title VI to the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
13.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1936.
14.
Id.
15.
Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists
Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 379 (1995).
16.
Id.
17.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
18.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B); Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citing RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 420 (1989)).
19.
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81 (first citing RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART
LAW 419–20 (1989); and then citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8D–5 (1994)); see Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citing Carter, 71 F.3d at 81).
20.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (e).
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While VARA is a victory for artists’ rights and has a
commendable purpose, many of the statute’s biggest advocates also note
that it does not offer the broad moral rights protections enjoyed
throughout Europe and does not bring US law into full conformity with
the Berne Convention.21 One important distinction between VARA and
the Berne Convention is the duration of protection. While VARA offers
protection for the life of the artist, the Berne Convention’s article 6bis
requires that moral rights last for the entire length of copyright
protection.22 Under VARA, for works created before June 1, 1991, if the
author retains a copy of the work, moral rights protection lasts for the
life of the author plus seventy years.23 If the artist did not retain a copy
of the work, then the artist possesses no moral rights for the artwork
created before June 1, 1991.24 Additionally, article 6bis applies to all
literary and artistic works, whereas VARA only applies to “works of
visual art,”25 with some notable exceptions.26
VARA protects works created on or after June 1, 1991, offering
moral rights protection for the lifetime of the author.27 Because VARA
does not offer as broad of protection as seen elsewhere, states have the
ability to enact statutes to bring moral rights protection closer to the
requirements existing within the Berne Convention.28 These state
statutes generally provide broader protection than what VARA offers
and restrict the alienability of moral rights.29

21.
Damich, supra note 8, at 947; Laura Gilbert, Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Is
Failing, ARTSY (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:20 AM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-why-thevisual-artists-rights-act-is-failing-to-protect-street-art-and-murals
[https://perma.cc/BA48W2MV].
22.
Damich, supra note 8, at 947.
23.
Jana S. Farmer & Adam Bialek, Where Moral Rights May Conflict with the Removal
of Confederate Statues, LAW.COM (Dec. 11, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/where-moralrights-may-conflict-073005258.html [https://perma.cc/Z8EH-LYBM].
24.
Id.
25.
Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6bis; Damich, supra note 8, at 947. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 for the statutory definition of a “work of visual art.”
26.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
27.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1935–36.
28.
Damich, supra note 8, at 947–48.
29.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B), 3(B) (West 2020) (defining “fine art” as “any
original work of visual or graphic art of any media . . . of recognized quality”); 5 R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 5-62-2(20), 4(a) (2020); CONN . GEN. STAT. §§ 42-116s(2), -116t (2019); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 987–89 (West 2020); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2102–05, 2107 (West 2020);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 2020). New York’s moral rights statute emphasizes
the value of an artist’s reputation, rather than the intrinsic value of the particular piece of art. As
a result, display of a mutilated original piece of art is prohibited only if the artist’s name is
associated with it. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2020). The passage of VARA
puts the enforceability of state moral rights statutes into question due to federal preemption.
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The enforcement mechanism of VARA allows for violations of an
artist’s moral rights to be subject to all civil copyright remedies.30 These
copyright remedies allow a court to grant an injunction to the artist to
prevent destruction, mutilation, or any other alteration of a qualifying
work.31 Artists may also seek monetary damages under the statute,
either actual damages or statutory damages.32 For statutory damages,
a court may award anywhere from $750 to $30,000 per copyrighted
work, and this can be increased to $150,000 per work if the copyright
infringement was willful.33 While other copyrighted works must be
registered before infringement to be eligible for statutory damages,
VARA-protected works do not have to be registered anywhere to recover
statutory damages or attorneys’ fees.34
A. Moral Rights in the United States Pre-VARA
Before VARA in the United States, artists were traditionally
denied any moral rights protections.35 For example, in the 1949 case
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, a church painted over a mural
portraying a bare-chested Jesus because the church’s parishioners felt
like the mural overly emphasized Jesus’s physical features in lieu of his
spiritual qualities.36 After the church painted over the mural, the artist
of the mural brought a suit to either compel damages or restore the
original painting, arguing that general customs in the art world dictate
that works of high artistic standards should not be altered or
destroyed.37 Additionally, the artist argued that he had a continued
“limited proprietary interest” in his work after its sale to reasonably
protect his honor and reputation as an artist, which included his right
to prevent the work from any alteration or destruction.38 However,
while acknowledging that moral rights are recognized elsewhere, the
court held that the concept of moral rights had not received acceptance
under US law.39 The Crimi court found that when the artist sold the
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 605, § 301, 104 Stat. 5128, 5131
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301).
30.
See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1972.
31.
17 U.S.C. § 502.
32.
17 U.S.C. § 504.
33.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
34.
See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1937–38.
35.
Chintan Amin, Note, Keep Your Filthy Hands Off My Painting! The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 315, 319 (1995).
36.
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 818 (quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947)).
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mural to the church, he transferred all his rights, title, and interest in
the mural.40
Crimi’s holding that artists do not retain rights in their work
after sale was typical for its time in the United States.41 However, some
artists looked outside of copyright law to find remedies in contract law
and the tort of unfair competition.42 It was not until 1976 that a US
court recognized artists’ moral rights as a cause of action in Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies.43 In Gilliam, members of the
popular comedy group “Monty Python” sued the American Broadcast
Companies (ABC) under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act44 for violating
the integrity of their television show by substantially editing the show’s
content that the network found obscene.45 Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act seeks to prevent misrepresentations made that may injure a
person’s business or personal reputation.46 The Gilliam court found
that the edited version of the show substantially departed from and
impaired the integrity of Monty Python’s work because the comedy
group had retained control over the scripts via copyright law.47 Despite
acknowledging that US law did not presently recognize moral rights,
the court recognized that the foundations of US copyright law could not
be reconciled with an artist’s inability to obtain relief for the mutilation
or misrepresentation of their work to the public. Thus, a cause of action
for moral rights was born.48

40.
Id. at 819. This raises an interesting question of whether, under VARA, an artist may
still hold some form of ownership over the artwork itself, separate from intellectual property. See
id.
41.
Amin, supra note 35, at 319–20; see Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (first quoting Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); and then quoting Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
25 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)).
42.
See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that substantial
cutting of an original work constitutes misrepresentation in contract law); Prouty v. Nat’l Broad.
Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265–66 (D. Mass. 1939) (finding an author had a valid cause of action under
the tort of misrepresentation when her novel was broadcast on television in inferior artistic and
commercial quality).
43.
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976).
44.
See Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). The Lanham Act is the federal statute that governs trademarks,
service marks, and unfair competition.
45.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17–18.
46.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
47.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.
48.
See id.
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B. Moral Rights Protection Under VARA
The first case to interpret VARA was Carter v.
Helmsley–Spear.49 The facts in the thought experiment found in the
introductory paragraph of this Note are based on the facts from Carter.
However, instead of a mural as the art in question, in Carter, the US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enjoined a building owner from
removing a large sculpture that occupied most of the lobby of his
building.50 The defendants became owners of the building that housed
the sculpture through a bankruptcy proceeding and then informed the
artists that they intended to remove the art from the building.51 As a
result, the artists sued under VARA and successfully received an
injunction to protect the sculpture from removal.52
When other circuits have interpreted VARA, property rights
tend to triumph over an artist’s moral rights.53 While some proponents
of VARA might describe the burdens imposed on property owners as
light, consisting of giving notice to the artist and waiting ninety days
for the artist to remove the art, the question then becomes how a VARA
case could ever transpire.54 A common reoccurring issue in VARA cases
is failure to give notice to artists.55 Eric Bjorgum, a prominent VARA
plaintiffs’ lawyer, states that property owners simply do not know about
VARA.56 In his practice, Bjorgum has noticed that once property owners
become aware of VARA, they become far less likely to ever have art on
buildings, which has negative consequences for not only the artist but
the general public as well.57
Additionally, the ambiguities within the statute related to the
recognized stature standard could lead to excessive litigation and
confusion for both the parties involved and the courts.58 Even if a party
is aware of VARA, there still may be a question of whether the artwork
is of recognized stature and therefore even offered any protection. The
statute itself does not define “recognized stature.” However, one bill
introduced to Congress before VARA’s enactment instructed courts to
look to expert opinion in deciding the stature of a particular work of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 80–81, 88.
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 81.
See Gilbert, supra note 21.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 324–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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art.59 In practice, the Carter court stated that a plaintiff must show that
the art possesses stature in the viewpoints of art experts, members of
the artistic community, or by society in general.60 As a whole, the
recognized stature standard departs from traditional copyright
principles because, prior to VARA, copyright law had not given
additional rights to copyrightable works based on quality.61 However,
any moral rights statute that offers protection to artwork regardless of
quality would certainly be overbroad.62
In one recent situation in Nashville, a local muralist made waves
by contacting various news organizations after Vanderbilt University
unilaterally decided to paint over one of his murals that depicted the
coaches of the university’s sports programs.63 Before its removal, the
mural had stood for twenty-seven years and undergone numerous
updates as coaches came and went.64 According to the artist, the
painting had become “iconic” to the area.65 However, through the years,
not everyone thought the mural was iconic in the same way. In fact,
the same mural faced complaints from Vanderbilt’s NAACP chapter
accusing the depiction of former Vanderbilt football coach Derek
Mason as being reminiscent of the minstrelsy era in which race was
exaggerated in art.66 Because Vanderbilt destroyed the mural without
informing the artist, he might have a convincing claim under VARA.
However, the line between protected “recognized stature” and
unprotected art would certainly be an unclear distinction.
VARA has recently come back into the spotlight in the aftermath
of the Second Circuit’s decision in Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P.67 In
Castillo, the art in question was a graffiti-covered compound in New
59.
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm. on
Pats., Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 17 (1987)
(statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
60.
Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
61.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1945.
62.
Id. at 1946. One article contends that the “stature” standard is a higher bar than one
requiring “quality.” See Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral
Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 905, 916–17 (1993).
63.
Sparks, supra note 1.
64.
Id.
65.
See Matthew Torres, Vanderbilt Coaches Mural Painted Over Without Artist Knowing,
WTVF, https://www.newschannel5.com/news/vanderbilt-coaches-mural-painted-over-without-artist-knowing [https://perma.cc/U9JU-369F] (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:21 PM).
66.
Nick Cole, Derek Mason Mural to Be Redone After Complaints, THE TENNESSEAN,
https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/college/vanderbilt/2014/03/31/vanderbilt-coach-derekmason-painting/7113205/ [https://perma.cc/9XJR-8Z2P] (Apr. 2, 2014, 12:40 AM).
67.
See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d
sub nom. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363
(2020) (mem.); Charron & Mencher, supra note 6.
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York known as 5Pointz.68 During its existence, the 5Pointz compound
housed approximately 10,650 works of art of differing quality and
lifespans.69 In May 2013, one of the contributing artists learned that
property developers sought approval from the city to destroy 5Pointz in
order to build luxury apartments on the site.70 In response, the artist
applied to make 5Pointz a site of cultural significance, but his
application was unsuccessful.71 The artist then turned to VARA and
sued the property developer to prevent destruction of the compound and
the accompanying art.72
In Castillo, first heard by the US District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in 2013, the court explicitly recognized that the
rights created by VARA are in tension with traditional notions of
property rights and attempted to balance the artists’ rights and the
property owners’ rights.73 The court rejected the plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and did not interfere with the developer’s desire
to tear down the compound so that he could build the luxury apartments
but cautioned the developer that he could be exposed to significant
monetary damages if the court ultimately determined that the artworks
were of “recognized stature” under VARA.74 The developer completely
ignored the court’s warning about damages and began to destroy the
compound that same night.75 Ultimately, the court found that forty-five
of the aerosol works had achieved recognized stature and the developer
had violated VARA by destroying them.76 The district court awarded
statutory damages set at $150,000 for each work, totaling $6.75 million
in damages.77 Persuaded by the seemingly bad faith acts on the part of
the developer, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment
in early 2020.78
Around the same time the Second Circuit awarded damages in
Castillo, the US Copyright Office conducted a study to determine
whether the government should expand moral rights protections under

68.
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 163.
73.
Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Cohen
v. G & M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
74.
Id.
75.
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 164.
78.
Id. at 178.
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US law.79 Published on April 23, 2019, the report concluded that “moral
rights and contract law [are] ‘generally working well and should not be
changed.’ At the current time, ‘there is no need for the creation of a
blanket moral rights statute.’”80 If Congress ever attempts to amend the
moral rights framework in US law, this report could serve as a roadmap
for Congress to follow.81 However, any moral rights expansion in the
United States may face staunch opposition, much of which can be traced
back to cultural differences between the United States and European
countries that offer broad moral rights protection.82
C. A VARA Takings Argument in Court
Only one VARA case has featured a potential takings
argument: Carter v. Helmsley–Spear.83 In Carter, briefly discussed
above, the district court enjoined a building’s owners from removing a
large sculpture from the building’s lobby, even though the art occupied
most of the lobby’s space.84 The defendants attempted to argue that
requiring the statue to remain on their property was a per se taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment because an injunction would give the
artist the right to control the use of the defendant’s property.85 The
court, emphasizing the substantial burdens faced by the defendants in
making the takings argument, was not persuaded.86 The Carter court
found that no taking had occurred because there was no permanent
physical invasion, noting that VARA protection lasts only for the
life of the author and is therefore neither a facial nor as applied

79.
Sam Berten, A Call for the Expansion of the Visual Artists Rights Act, UNIV. OF CIN.
L. REV. BLOG (June 9, 2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/06/09/a-call-for-the-expansion-of-thevisual-artists-rights-act/#_ednref8 [https://perma.cc/AA2N-7DT8]; Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright
Law, COPYRIGHTLAWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.copyrightlaws.com/moral-rights-in-u-scopyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/L6PE-NEJZ]; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND
INTEGRITY: EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2019).
80.
Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 79. The Copyright Office’s report
recommended three changes to VARA, which included (1) clarifying that VARA pertains to both
artworks created pursuant to a contract and artwork for commercial use; (2) offering guidance for
courts trying to interpret the “recognized stature” standard; and (3) not allowing any joint author
to waive rights without written consent from other joint authors. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note
79, at 5.
81.
Berten, supra note 79; see Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 79.
82.
Berten, supra note 79.
83.
Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
84.
Id. at 337.
85.
Id. at 326, 328.
86.
Id. at 326–28.
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permanent physical invasion.87 Additionally, the Carter court stated
that preservation of artwork through VARA may make some properties
more valuable by generating public interest in the sites.88 The court
found that the building owners were already compensated by the artist
because of a supposed increase in property value as a result of the
sculpture’s existence attached to the building.89
While the takings arguments were of primary focus in front of
the district court in Carter, the Second Circuit did not address the issue
at all.90 On appeal, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s
ruling as a result of its finding that the artists were employees and not
independent contractors, rendering them ineligible for VARA
protection.91
II. WHEN VARA MIGHT BE A TAKING
A. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion
Requiring a landowner to maintain an artist’s artwork on his
land as a result of VARA could potentially be a per se physical invasion
if the occupation is considered permanent.92 At first glance, a VARA
defendant may have difficulty arguing that VARA-protected artwork is
“permanent” because of the fact that the statute only confers a lifetime
right of protection.93 However, despite this hurdle, a landowner may be
able to persuade a court that the invading artwork is “permanent,” not
in the durational sense, but by comparing the statute to other
regulations that appeared limited in duration and were still found to be
permanent.94
Even though VARA protection explicitly only lasts for the
lifetime of the artist, a court still may consider any attached artwork as
a permanent invasion of another’s property because the distinction
between temporary and permanent in the takings analysis is far
from clear.95 The answer surprisingly does not necessarily boil down
to an infinite duration of occupation. Rather, the Supreme Court has

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 327–28.
Id. at 328.
Id.
See id. at 326–27; Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995).
Carter, 71 F.3d at 88.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1982).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 59–61 (2017).
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focused on whether the invading material exclusively occupies a space,
comparing a traveler walking on the street to a telephone pole.96
The Supreme Court has found invasions that exclusively occupy
space within another’s property to be permanent, even if the invasion
is not infinite in duration.97 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., a per se physical invasion occurred when a New York
statute required a landowner to permit a cable television company to
install its equipment on her property.98 However, as noted by the
dissent, the regulation did not require the television equipment to
remain in place permanently, but only so long as the property remained
residential and the company wanted to maintain the equipment.99
Essentially, a telephone pole, cable television equipment, or a work of
art attached to a building could only be invading another person’s
property for a limited period of time, but still be considered “permanent”
under a takings analysis because of the exclusive occupation of another
person’s land.
Similar to Loretto, VARA sanctions an exclusive occupation of
someone else’s physical property with the property of another person.100
When a mural occupies a wall of a building, the artwork takes the space
occupied by the art from the building owner because he can no longer
fully utilize the wall bound to the artwork. As a result, even though a
VARA invasion does not appear to be permanent in a durational
sense, a landowner may have a fighting chance in persuading a
court that the statute meets the requirements of a per se physical
invasion.101 If a court does consider the invasion as permanent, a
landowner-defendant’s chances of success in the argument likely
increase substantially.
If the invasion is considered permanent for takings analysis
purposes, VARA may also give rise to the artist holding a nonpossessory
interest in the use of the property.102 A person with a nonpossessory
interest in a property has the right to use or restrict the use of another
person’s land, even though he does not hold any title to the property.103
In the VARA context, when a work of art attached to a building is
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
Heightened
(1988).
103.

See St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1893).
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428–30 (citations omitted).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id. at 437 (majority opinion).
See id.
See Lawrence W. Andrea, Comment, Trespass at High Tide: The Supreme Court Gives
Scrutiny to a State Imposed Easement Requirement, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 995–97
See id. at 994–97.
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protected under the statute, the artist has a nonpossessory interest in
the use of the property because the landowner can no longer fully use
that space how he sees fit. The artist can dictate how the landowner
fully utilizes his property by forbidding any destruction, mutilation, or
alteration of the artwork attached to the building, even though the
artist does not hold any title to the artwork. In this sense, VARA
may create a quasi-easement held by artists, potentially denying a
landowner his traditional property rights.104
B. VARA as a Regulatory Taking
Enjoining a landowner from fully using his property or forcing
him to endure a decrease in value as a result of VARA’s existence could
be a regulatory taking. However, under the relevant total regulatory
takings analysis, a VARA defendant will likely struggle in establishing
the loss of all economic value of the property.105 As a result, the analysis
for a regulatory taking claim for VARA would likely proceed under the
Penn Central factors.106 The Penn Central factors require a court to
consider the character of the invasion, the economic impact of the
regulation applied to the property, and the property owner’s distinct
investment-backed expectations related to the property.107 Regarding
the character of the governmental invasion factor, the Court stated
that a taking is more likely to have occurred when the interference
with the property is a physical invasion by the government and not
merely adjusting economic factors.108 Using Penn Central, a
landowner may try to argue that VARA consists of a total regulatory
taking of a smaller property interest within the larger bundle of
property rights.109
For example, VARA may deprive a property owner of the right
to exclude others from her land, namely the artist. This would be a
complete loss of the right to exclude that is less than the whole bundle
of rights but would still be a taking. Despite conflicting rulings about
whether a total regulatory taking may apply to a smaller property
interest within the whole property, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island made

104.
See id. at 991.
105.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–27 (1992).
106.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330
(2002) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019–20, 1019 n.8); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 119–20 (1978).
107.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
108.
Id.
109.
Generally, courts ultimately end up characterizing partial takings claims as total
takings claims if the court plans to award compensation. See id.
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clear the possibility of a compensable takings claim regarding small
physical occupations.110 In Palazzolo, the court rejected a landowner’s
takings argument after a land use moratorium resulted in his property
depreciating in value from $3,150,000 to $200,000 because the
regulation did not fully eliminate all property value.111 However, the
Palazzolo court clearly articulated that a diminution of value case may
well warrant compensation and that notice of the regulation does not
prohibit recovery.112
In the expensive New York real estate market featured in
Castillo, VARA could have significantly depreciated the value of the
graffiti-covered warehouses if the landowners could not develop the
valuable real estate.113 While small losses of value resulting from the
relevant regulation generally do not constitute compensable takings,
the situation in Castillo could result in substantial depreciation of
value.114
In applying the Penn Central factors to a hypothetical temporary
takings argument in Castillo, the real estate developers possessed an
arguably reasonable, investment-backed expectation that they could
develop the land they owned as they saw fit.115 The question then
becomes whether the artists’ moral rights and the public’s interest in
protecting artwork of recognized stature outweigh the developers’
traditional property rights. Arguably, the developers’ property interests
along with the relevant land use efficiency arguments outweigh the
artists’ rights and the preservation of artwork.116
A VARA defendant may also be able to argue that the
requirement to maintain the artwork and prohibit removal is a
temporary regulatory taking.117 A temporary regulatory taking occurs
when a regulation temporarily prohibits a landowner from fully using
his land.118 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, the Supreme Court found a taking occurred after a local
110.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); Wendie L. Kellington, New
Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, LAND USE L., http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/takings_update.htm [https://perma.cc/8SXF-9F4A] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
111.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606–09.
112.
Id. at 606–08; Kellington, supra note 110.
113.
See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2020).
114.
See id.; Kellington, supra note 110.
115.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Castillo,
950 F.3d at 162.
116.
Drew Thornley, The Visual Artists Rights Act’s “Recognized Stature” Provision: A Case
for Repeal, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (2019).
117.
See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
311–13 (1987).
118.
Id. at 318.
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ordinance temporarily prohibited a church from constructing a
recreational area for disabled children.119 In its holding, the Court
emphasized that the temporary regulatory takings inquiry must focus
directly upon the severity of the burden that VARA imposes upon
private property rights.120 Therefore, a court should not inquire into the
motivation or purpose behind VARA, its value or benefit, or the
correctness or effectiveness of the Copyright Office’s implementation.121
Instead, the key to the takings analysis here is answering whether
VARA is “functionally comparable to government appropriation or
invasion of private property.”122
In certain contexts, VARA can be functionally comparable to an
invasion of private property if the government requires a landowner to
maintain someone else’s property on his land.123 Similar to First
English, a landowner could be enjoined from developing, remodeling, or
even fully utilizing the land during the statutory period of protection.124
If the graffiti artwork in Castillo ended up temporarily prohibiting
development, the landowners could have had a persuasive argument
that VARA was a temporary regulatory taking because the statute is
comparable to the government invading private property.125
C. How VARA May Affect a Property’s Value and Use
If a court enjoins a landowner from removing unwanted artwork
attached to a building as a result of VARA, the art may become an
encumbrance on the property.126 An encumbrance lessens the value,
use, or enjoyment of a property.127 Even though the landowner still may
be able to sell the property containing the artwork, the value of the
property may decrease as a result of the physical occupation.128 Because
encumbrances can have an adverse effect on a property’s value or use,
buyers must perform their due diligence in any real estate purchase to
identify any potential encumbrances, such as a lien or restrictive

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 307, 322.
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
See id. at 539–43.
See id. at 542.
See id.
See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 307.
See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2020).
See James Kimmons, Encumbrances in Real Estate Defined, THE BALANCE
SMALL
BUS.,
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/encumbrances-in-real-estate-defined-2866599
[https://perma.cc/Y7FT-FK2F] (Nov. 14, 2019).
127.
Id.
128.
See id.
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covenant, before completing the transaction.129 As a result, when
dealing with a property that has artwork attached, it is best practice to
find the artist and have him sign a waiver of all VARA rights. However,
sometimes building owners act first before asking these questions. In
the defense of the landowners who do act first and then face a potential
VARA lawsuit, VARA imposes no requirement that artists register
their works with the US Copyright Office to be eligible for statutory
damages. As a result, even though ignorance of law is never an excuse,
a landowner could think that she is acting with no risk given that there
is no way for the owner to tell whether VARA protects the artwork
before acting.
If courts remain unwilling to find certain VARA-protected
artwork as a taking, artists, rather than landowners, are more likely to
feel the effects. As landowners catch wind of VARA damages paid by
other property owners for unsuspectingly using their own property,
landowners may become increasingly wary of hiring artists to paint
murals or create other art attached to buildings. Having a judge rather
than the free market determine the success of a particular piece of art
may lead to doubts about the true merits of a work of art.130 If more
people become less inclined to install artwork on their properties and
people become increasingly suspicious of the true merits of quality
artwork, VARA may have detrimental effects for both the art profession
and society as a whole.
III. POTENTIAL TAKINGS ARGUMENTS IN THE VARA CONTEXT
At a minimum, traditional notions of property rights clash with
an artist’s moral rights under VARA.131 This Part explores potential
takings arguments in the VARA context, concluding that there very
well may be instances in which a landowner may have a valid takings
argument in defense to a VARA lawsuit.
A. Evaluating the Takings Arguments Made in Carter
Even though the defendants in Carter failed to convince the
Southern District of New York that requiring a large sculpture
occupying their building’s lobby to remain in the building resulted in a
taking, the court very well could have decided the case differently.132 In
129.
Id.
130.
Bensen, supra note 7, at 1147.
131.
See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing
Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
132.
Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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its ruling, the court compared VARA’s mandate to Penn Central’s
preservation laws.133 However, while analogous, VARA’s main purpose
lies in protecting the rights of artists, not in historical preservation of
the arts.134
In focusing heavily on the fact that VARA protection is only
a lifetime right limited in duration, the court misapplied the
temporary-permanent distinction displayed in Loretto.135 Recall that
the Loretto court struck down the regulation at issue in that case even
though the statute did not require the cable television to remain in place
forever, but only so long as the building remained residential and the
company wanted the equipment in place.136 Similarly, in the VARA
context, protectable artwork attached to a building must remain in
place if it is of recognized stature and the artist wishes the work to
stay.137 Just like a telephone pole that may only physically invade
someone else’s property for a finite period of time, the space that the
artwork occupies is exclusive, and therefore, should be considered
permanent.138
Additionally, in finding that the building owners were already
compensated by the artist because of the supposed increase in property
value derived from the sculpture’s attachment to the building, the court
misapplied the law.139 Even if the artwork did actually increase the
value of the property, which seems unlikely because of the limitations
on how an owner could use the building’s lobby, this increase would not
qualify as compensation to the owners because they would have already
been entitled to that value as a result of purchasing the building with
the accompanying sculpture in the first place. As a result, any increase
in value resulting from the artwork could not operate as compensation
to the landowners because they will have already paid for any and all
value when purchasing the artwork.
B. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion
In the highly contextual nature of VARA, a landowner may be
able to successfully avoid VARA liability by arguing that, depending on
the circumstances, certain applications of the statute result in a
133.
Id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
134.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915.
135.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982); Blais,
supra note 95, at 59–60.
136.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438; Blais, supra note 95, at 59–60.
137.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
138.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437; Blais, supra note 95, at 59–60.
139.
See Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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permanent physical invasion or a regulatory taking. Despite the heavy
burden on the landowner, this Section demonstrates that VARA may,
in certain circumstances, result in a compensable taking. Even though
the one court that has heard a VARA case featuring a takings argument
(Carter) did not agree with the landowners’ claims, the court seemingly
misapplied the relevant takings analysis, and a future defendant may
find a more sympathetic court.140
Even though any VARA case turns on a highly factual inquiry,
a landowner-defendant is most likely to have success arguing that
VARA consists of a per se physical invasion by requiring the landowner
to maintain someone else’s property on the landowner’s property. To get
past the temporary-permanent distinction hurdle, a VARA defendant
should emphasize the connections between the regulation at issue in
Loretto and the mandates set forth through VARA.141 Despite the
Loretto regulation not having a permanent effect, the Supreme Court
still found the regulatory action to be a permanent physical invasion
because the cable television companies exclusively controlled the space
occupied by the invading equipment.142
VARA-protected artwork can be considered permanent in the
sense that the art exclusively occupies the space attached to the
landowner’s property.143 Any per se physical invasion has to be
permanent for a court to award compensation.144 However, permanence
does not necessarily mean infinite duration.145 Even though VARA
protection only lasts for the lifetime of the author, there are many
similarities to the regulation at issue in Loretto and VARA’s
requirements.146 If the artwork cannot be removed from the building
without destruction and the court enjoins the landowner from removing
the work, the artwork effectively snaps significant sticks within the
landowner’s bundle of property rights.147 Similar to the television
equipment in Loretto, the artwork exclusively possesses the space that
it invasively occupies, denying the owner the right to use the lobby or
wall for his own purposes.148 Additionally, such a situation removes a
landowner’s right to exclude the artist from possessing and using the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Blais, supra note 95, at 55.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d).
Id.; see Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437.
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occupied space within the property.149 As a result, a VARA defendant
may have a strong precedential argument, despite the fact that VARA’s
protection is limited in duration. Still, this may be a substantial burden
to overcome.
If a VARA defendant is able to overcome the hurdle that is
the permanent-temporary distinction, the likelihood of a successful
argument increases substantially because requiring a person to
maintain a third party’s property on someone else’s land is a per se
physical invasion. As a matter of property theory, more than one person
can have property rights in a specific item of property. As a result,
VARA gives property rights in the art to the artists, despite the fact
that the landowner clearly holds the title to the work. When a building
has a work of VARA-protected art attached to it, both the artist and the
building owner could hold property rights in the artwork. VARA would
require a landowner to maintain the artist’s property on his own
property against his will. If forced to maintain the artist’s property, the
landowner effectively loses his rights to exclude and dispose of property
as a result of the statute. Thus, without compensation, such an invasion
would be an unlawful taking.
C. VARA as a Total Regulatory Taking
Even if a court does not consider certain applications of VARA
as amounting to a permanent physical occupation of property, a
landowner-defendant may still be able to argue that VARA is a
compensable temporary regulatory taking. A regulatory taking occurs
when a regulation’s or statute’s effect is so burdensome on a property
owner that it equates to a direct appropriation of the property.150 In this
analysis, the court must consider the three Penn Central factors and
determine whether the regulation goes “too far” and results in a
taking.151 Recall that these factors consist of the character of the
invasion, the economic impact of the regulation on the property, and the
property owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations.152
Regarding the character of an invasion resulting from VARA,
the invasion is physical in nature rather than consisting of mere
economic adjustments.153 Under Lingle, a temporary regulatory takings
inquiry must focus directly upon the severity of the burden that VARA

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Charron & Mencher, supra note 6.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
Id.
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imposes upon a landowner’s property rights.154 Here, the critical
question would be whether VARA is “functionally comparable to
appropriation or invasion” of the landowner’s property.155 A regulatory
takings argument under VARA benefits from this rule because VARA
requires a landowner to physically maintain the invading artwork on
the property without the ability to exclude or fully use his entire
property.156
A regulation may be a compensable taking if it does not advance
a legitimate state interest, which is a low standard to meet. Here, the
inquiry may depend on how a court interprets VARA’s purpose. If a
court defines VARA’s purpose as protecting the interests of artists, with
the preservation of art being a derivative purpose of the statute, there
may be less of a legitimate state interest. Given that the state interest
standard is a low bar, a court would likely find that VARA promotes a
legitimate state interest and would lean against a finding of a
compensable taking.157 However, under the Penn Central factors, no
single factor is dispositive in a court’s determination.158 Therefore, a
court’s finding that VARA promotes legitimate state interest does not
lead to a certain outcome.
Even if a regulation advances a legitimate state interest, the
state action still may constitute a taking if it goes against an
owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations.159 When buying a
property that features attached artwork, the property owner is expected
to have awareness of VARA’s requirements.160 However, VARA does not
protect all artwork and instead only offers a safe harbor for works of
recognized stature. Therefore, even though ignorance of law is no
excuse, a landowner may reasonably believe that the artwork does not
meet the recognized stature requirement.161 VARA itself does not define
recognized stature but instead leaves it to judges to decided which art
qualifies.162 There is also no requirement for artists to register their

154.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
155.
Id. at 542.
156.
See id.
157.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
158.
Id. at 124.
159.
See id.
160.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d).
161.
See John Bicknell, Comment, Is Graffiti Worthy of Protection? Changes Within the
Recognized Stature Requirement of the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
337, 341 (2014); Robinson, supra note 4, at 1937–38.
162.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1945.
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works to achieve “recognized stature.”163 The question then becomes,
are judges qualified to become certified art critics? In any event, the line
between what may be of recognized stature and what does not qualify
is an uncertain one.
Outside of the murky waters of the “recognized stature”
requirement, in order to be a compensable regulatory taking, VARA
must still render the property at issue valueless.164 Even though the
Palazzolo court stated that it could be possible for a diminution of value
case to receive compensation, that seems unlikely to apply to a VARA
case.165 While, as noted above, a landowner may attempt to argue that
VARA is a total taking of a singular property right, most partial takings
claims ultimately end up being characterized as total takings claims if
the court plans to award compensation.
As a result, a landowner may endeavor to argue that VARA
consists of a total taking of his rights to exclude or fully use his
property.166 While the property interest appropriated is less than the
whole, it still may be a compensable taking.167 However, even though a
partial takings claim is possible, most courts would likely characterize
any partial takings claim as a total takings claim.168 In any event, as a
practical matter, few takings claims find success when analyzed under
the Penn Central factors.169 As a result, a VARA defendant’s best
takings argument likely falls under the per se physical invasion
category.
D. A Future for VARA?
This Note does not argue that VARA is facially unconstitutional.
Rather, this Note contends that, in certain contexts, requiring
landowners to maintain someone else’s artwork on their property could
require just compensation. In order to avoid these situations, perhaps a
court would have to firmly state that courts should prioritize and
protect the property rights of landowners over the moral rights of
artists. Alternatively, Congress could repeal and amend VARA to

163.
Cynthia Esworthy, From Monty Python to Leona Hemsley: A Guide to the Visual
Artists Rights Act, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (1997), [http://web.archive.org/web/20030827213232/http:/arts.endow.gov/artforms/manage/VARA.html].
164.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
165.
Id.
166.
See Kellington, supra note 110.
167.
See id.
168.
See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Kellington, supra note 110.
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Kellington, supra note 110.
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remove the language of preventing destruction of the artwork attached
to buildings from the statute.170 If Congress did amend VARA in this
fashion, the statute would clearly indicate that landowners’ property
rights should stand firm in the face of any moral rights that an artist
has attached to a property. Congress could even act less drastically and
require artists to register works of visual art with the US Copyright
Office in order to be eligible for statutory damages, as is the case with
all other copyrighted works.171 This requirement would more
reasonably put the burden on landowners to check the registry before
acting and would give all relevant parties clearer information on which
to act in any given situation involving VARA. As the statute stands,
there remains much uncertainty. Despite the uncertainty, as the US
Copyright Office concluded in its 2019 study, the government feels like
VARA is currently generally well functioning and changes are
unlikely.172
IV. CONCLUSION
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 serves a noble purpose of
protecting artists’ rights and their work. However, in doing so, Congress
inevitably gave rise to a clash of property rights in situations when
buildings feature attached artwork. When utilized, VARA may sever
several sticks in the landowner’s bundle of property rights, which may,
in certain circumstances, result in a compensable taking. Even though
the landowner faces a substantial burden in proving a taking occurred,
the fact that the artwork physically invades a landowner’s property,
requires the owner to maintain someone else’s property on his land, and
gives a third party the right to control the use of another’s property, the
landowner may still have a fighting chance.
Proponents of VARA frequently point out that there is a low bar
for landowners to meet to avoid any VARA liability and highlight the
fact that ignorance of law is no excuse. However, in defense of any
landowners that do face potential VARA liability, there are a lot of
murky standards within the statute that can lead to unpredictable
outcomes. If any VARA amendments ever do arise, perhaps it would
ease the tension between traditional property rights and artists’ moral
rights if Congress supplied more guidelines for the “recognized stature”
requirement or potentially added a registry requirement to be eligible
for statutory damages. As the statute stands today, however, VARA

170.
171.
172.

Thornley, supra note 116, at 352.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1937–38.
Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 79.
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does open up the possibility for a head-on collision between an artist’s
moral rights and a landowner’s property rights, potentially bringing the
question of when art might constitute a taking into the forefront of the
litigation.
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